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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)

)

Plaintiff & Respondent,)

)

-vs-

)

CATHRYN E. PFANNENSTIEL,

)

Case No. J...!l.!]

)

)

Defendant & Appellant. )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appeal from the denial of a motion to
quash the information, and the appellant's
subsequent conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with issuing
a check against insufficient funds in violation
of Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953)
as amended.

The defendant moved that the in-

formation alleged no crime under the above
cited statute.

The motion was denied and this

appeal was taken from said denial and defendant's subsequent conviction.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the
denial of her motion to quash and her subsequent conviction.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Cathryn E. Pfannenstiel,
on the 14th day of July, 1967, drew a check on
the Sunset Branch of the Clearfield State Bank
payable to Ogden Tire Center in payment for
parts and services for her car in the amount
of $11.49. (T-5).

Said check was written for

the exact amount of the bill and the defendant
received no money in return. (R-15).
The check was presented to the drawee
bank for payment on July 19, 1967, and again
on August 1st, 1967. (T-10).

On both occasions

there were insufficient funds in the defendant's
account to cover the check and the check was
dishonored.
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On December 8, 1967, the defendant was
charged by information with the issuing of a
check against insufficient funds in violation
of Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated, (1953)
as amended.

(R-2).

The defendant, by her

attorney, filed a motion to quash the information, (R-5) on the grounds that said information did not set forth a crime under the above
cited section.

Said motion was

denied,f~-11)

and the defendant was convicted.
From the denial of the motion to quash
and defendant's subsequent conviction this
appeal was taken.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT 1
THE COMPLAINT AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN
SUPPORT THEREOF BY THE STATE DOES NOT SET FORTH
A CRIME UNDER SECTION 76-20-11, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED (1953) AS AMENDED.
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The courts have consistently held that
before one may be punished under a criminal
statute their acts must be clearly within the
scope of the statute.
The acts of the defendant in the case at
bar are not included within the scope of Sect ion 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as
amended.
The Utah legislature by specifically making illegal the issuance of bogus checks for
the "payment of money" and for "payment of
wages 1 ' have by imp! ication excluded al 1 other
acts not enumerated.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a check
is not money.
It is inconsistent to interpret the terms
11

for the payment of money 11 as meaning "in sub-

stitution for monei' and at the same time to
enunciate specific instances in which the

5
issuance of a bogus check would be a crime, as
the first interpretation would include all instances in which bogus checks were knowingly
offered as payment.
The defendant in the case at bar received
no money in exchange for the check she wrote,
nor was the check issued for the payment of
wages.

As a result that act of the defendant

was not within Section 76-20-11, Utah Code
Annotated (1953) as amended and her conviction
must be set aside.
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ARGUMENT
POINT
THE INFORMATION AND EVIDENCE INTRODUCED IN
SUPPORT THEREOF BY THE STATE DOES NOT SET FORTH
A CRIME UNDER SECTION 76-20-11 OF THE UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED AS AMENDED (1953).
Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965 reads
essentially as follows:
•••
Any person who for h imse If or as
the agent or representative of another
or as an officer of a corporation, willfully, with intent to defraud, makes or
draws or utters or delivers any check,
or draft or order upon any bank or depository or person, or firm, or corporation,
for the payment of money or wages for labor
performed, knowing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering, or delivering that
the maker or drawer or the corporation has
not sufficient funds in, or credit with
said bank or depository, or person, or
firm, or corporation, for the payment of
such checks, drafts, or order, in full
upon its presentation, • . . , is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or in the
State prison for not more than five years. 11
(Emphasis supplied).
11
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A.

A particular act must be clearly within
the scope of the statute in order for a
conviction thereunder to stand.
The Supreme Court of the United States

has held that:
Before one may be punished it must
appear that his case is plainly within
the statute; there are no constructive
offenses. United States v. Lacher, 134
U.S. 624, 628, 33 Led. 1080, 1083, 10
S. Ct 625; United States v. Chase, 135
U.S. 255, 261, 34 Led 117, TQ"'S:" Ct 756.
rr •••

Again in United States v. Williams, 341
U.S. 70, 95 Led. 758, 71 S. Ct. 581, The
Supreme Court stated:
"The criminal statutes should be given
the meaning their language most obviously
invites; their scope should not be extended
to conduct not clearly within their terms. 11
The Oklahoma Supreme Court succinctly
stated the general policy which whould be
applied in the application of statutory law
in American First Title and Trust Co. v.

~

Federal Savings and Loan, 415 P2d, 930,939,

8
(1966), when it stated in reference to a
statute regulating deficiency judgments:
"· •. nothing may be read into a statute
which is not within the manifest intention of the legislature as gathered from
the act itself and that a statute should
not be construed any more broadly or
given any greater effect than its terms
require."
Along the same lines the Utah Supreme
Court has stated:
The interpretation of a statute must
be based on the language used, and courts
have no power to rewrite a statute to
make it conform to intention not expressed. 11
Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co. V.
Public Service Commission.
155 P2d, 184
( 1945).
11

The defendant asserts that the act for which
she was convicted is not covered by Section
76-20-11, of the Utah Code Annotated as amended, and that her conviction must be set aside.
B.

The act for which the defendant was convicted does not constitute a crime under
Section 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
as amended.
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Bad check statutes are typically of two
different types.
The most common type is that which condemns the giving of bogus checks for specific
items.

An example of this type of bad check

statute is found in Wyoming and Oklahoma.
The Wyoming statute reads essentially as
fol lows:
"Whoever, with intent to defraud by obtaining money, merchandize, property-,credit, .£!:,other things of value . . •
or who, in the payment of~ obligation,
shall make,draw, utter or deliver any
check • • . knowing at the time of such
making . • . that • . . (he) has not
sufficient funds . • . shall be guilty
of a felony • . . 11 Section 6-39 W.S.
( 1957). (Emph.:is is supp 1 i ed) .
The Oklahoma bad check statute is similar
to that of Wyoming.

21 D.S. 1951, Section 1541.

The second type of bad check statute is
more general and is evidenced by the statute
now in force in Arizona.
The Arizona statute reads essentially as
fol lows:

10
"A person who for himself or for another,
willfully, with intent to defraud, makes,
draws, utters or delivers to another person or persons a check or checks or draft
or drafts on a bank or depository for~
ment of money, knowing at the time of such
making, drawing, uttering or delivering,
that he or his principal does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, such
bank or depository to meet the check or
checks or draft or drafts in full upon
presentation, shall be guilty as follows.
" A.R.S. Section 13-316 (1965)
(Emphasis added).
As a general rule bad check statutes
which 1 ist the various situations in which the
issuance of a bogus check would be a crime,
limit the application of such statutes to the
instances enumerated.

Bailey v. State of

Wyoming, 408 P2d, 244 (1965); Snider v. State
of Oklahoma, 338 P2d 892, (1959);

State of
-----

West Virginia v. H. B. Stout, 95 S.E. 2d 639.
In the Stout case, supra, the statute in
question condemned any person who made, issued
or delivered to another person, for value, any
check or draft on any bank and obtains from

11

such other any credit, money, goods, or other
property of value, having no funds or insuff icient funds to cover it.
The court in applying the statute held
that when the defendant gave a bogus check in
payment for bulldozer work done by one J. G.
Singleton, that such act did not constitute
a crime under their statute.

The court said

that the payment by check was conditioned and
when such payment aborted no harm was done to
Singleton because he still had a right of
action and that no value flowed to the defendant because he

remained liable on the debt.

Statutes of the second type are more
general in that they condemn the writing of
bogus checks "for the payment of money".

They

are construed broadly and require only that
the defendant write a check on insufficient
funds with intent to defraud.

State v.

12
Devinney, 403 P2d 921 (1965), State v. Weis
375 P2d 735, (1962).
Originally the Utah bad check statute was
almost identical to that of Arizona, using the
same "for payment of moneyi 1 terminology.

In 1965

this statute was amended and the words

11

or for

wages for work performed" were added.

By so

amending the statute the legislature deprived
it of its general nature and converted it into
a statute which specifically prohibits the issuing of checks on insufficient funds for two purposes only, for the payment of money and for
wages.
It is a general principal of interpretation that the mention of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of another; expressio
unius est. exclusio alterius.

Walla Walla v.

Walla Wal la Water Co. 172 U.S. 1, 43 Led 341,
19 S.Ct. 77,

13

The Utah Supreme Court first enunciated
this doctrine in Utah in 1899 when it stated:
Where a statute enumerates the persons
and things to be affected by its provisions, there is an implied exclusion of
others, and the natural inference follows
that it is not intended to be general. 11
University of Utah v. Richards, 20 Utah
457, 59 p 96 (1899).

11

The State Legislature by specifically designating two sets of circumstances under which a
bad check charge would lie has, by implication
excluded all others.
Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965, clearly
provides that checks issued for two items, and
two items only can be the basis for a criminal
conviction thereunder.
The statute specifically provides that the
check drawn on insufficient funds must be given
for

11

payment of money 11 or

11

for wages for labor

performed 11 •
If the Legislature had wished to go further,
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as most state legislatures have, they would
have included other things of value or credit
or an account, or for goods or property.
In the case at bar the defendant's check
was given in payment for parts and services to
her car.

(T-5)

The defendant received no money,

the check being written for the exact amount of
the bi 11. (R-15).
Under the circumstances of this case by
no interpretation could the check of defendant
be considered as having been given
ment of money" or

11

11

for the pay-

wages 11 as required by the

statute.
It must be pointed out rtt this point that
a check is not money.

The Utah Commercial Code

as set forth in 70A-l-201, (24) Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended defines money as follows:
"Money means a medium of exchange authorized or adopted by a domestic or foreign
government as a part o f •its currency II •
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For the above reasons the defendant's
check was not given for the

11

payment of moneyi •

or for "wages" and therefore was not within the
purview of the statute here in question and her
conviction must be reversed.
C.

The terms

11

for payment of money" as used

in Section 76-20-11 as amended in 1965, cannot
be interpreted to mean

11

as a substitute for

money".
The Utah Supreme Court in reference to
statutory interpretation stated that:
~he meaning of doubtful words or phrases
must be determined in light of and must
take their character from associated words
or phrases. 11 Heathman v. Giles, 374 P2d
8 3 9' ( 196 2) •
1

In 1 ight of the aforementioned principals
it is inconsistent that the legislature could
interpret the terms
as meaning

11

11

for the payment of money 11

in substitution of money" and at

the same time think it necessary to provide
another prohibited category of activity.

As a

matter of logic the first interpretation would
extend to a check issued on insufficient funds

16
for the payment of wages because the check
would be issued as a substitute for money.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief the
acts of the defendant did not constitute a
crime under 76-20-11, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) as amended, and the defendant's conviction must be set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
WM. H. BOWMAN
Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
Weber County Bar Legal
Services, 203 24th
Street, Ogden, Utah

